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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Fourth Circuit was not required to take such steps to reach its
result in Lankford. But its deliberate mention of the possible value of its
injunction in assuring racial peace may presage a significant development
in federal equity doctrine.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF THE JUVENILE CODE
State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966)
On December 3, 1963, Joseph Franz Arbeiter, age fifteen, was taken
into custody by the St. Louis police. The police suspected that Arbeiter
had fatally stabbed Mrs. Nancy Zanone the day before. Following an
interrogation, Arbeiter confessed to the stabbing. In the course of the
questioning, the police told Arbeiter that a witness placed him near the
Zanone residence at the time of the stabbing; in fact, there was no such
witness. Further, the police neglected to tell Arbeiter that Mrs. Zanone
had died as a result of the stabbing. Approximately four hours after
Arbeiter's apprehension he was turned over to the juvenile authorities.
Subsequently, Arbeiter was certified by the juvenile court to stand trial as
an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to life imprison-
ment.
An appeal taken to the Supreme Court of Missouri resulted in the re-
versal of the conviction.' The court held that the failure of the police to
comply with section 211.061 of the Missouri Juvenile Code, requiring an
arresting officer to take a juvenile "immediately and directly before the
juvenile court," required a finding that Arbeiter's confession was inadmiss-
able.2
The proliferation of juvenile courts dating from the beginning of the
twentieth century has not been totally successful.' Increasingly, the juvenile
1. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
2. Id.
3. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 179,
183 N.E. 353, 356 (1932) (dissenting opinion); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 610, 109
A.2d 523, 528 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955) (dissenting opinion); Antieau,
Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961); Handler, The
Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wxs.
L. REv. 7; Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 97 (1961); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rnv. 547
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system has been critized for failure to exercise its parens patriae power to
insure that the denial of constitutional safeguards does not result in basic
unfairness to the juveniles whom the system was established to serve.4 It
is against this background that the Arbeiter decision must be analyzed.
The Arbeiter decision can initially be examined by analogizing it to the
McNabb-Mallory doctrine, which is based on Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 5(a). Both seek to resolve conflicts between police detention
and interrogation practices and the dictates of governing rules. The Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule states that any person placed under arrest by federal
authorities must be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay,"
which means before interrogation.' Any confession obtained by federal
authorities in violation of this doctrine is inadmissible.' The rationale of
the rule is that bringing an arrestee before a magistrate prior to interrogation
serves the dual function of acquainting the arrestee with his constitutional
rights and discouraging over-zealous interrogation by the authorities.'
Since the McNabb-Mallory rule is not a constitutional requirement, but
rather a procedural requirement of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
it is not mandatory on the states." While several states have statutes quite
similar to Rule 5(a), the McNabb-Mallory rule has been rejected in all
states9 except, perhaps, Michigan.'0 The Arbeiter decision and its counter-
parts in other jurisdictions stand as somewhat of an anomaly." That is,
while the states have refused to exclude the confessions of adults when
statutory requirements for arraignment are not complied with, some juris-
dictions have been willing to apply a rule analogous to McNabb-Mallory
(1957); Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law, 11 WAYNE L. Rxv.
597 (1965).
4. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Antieau, supra note 3. For an
analysis of the particular rights that various juvenile courts deny juveniles see cases cited
in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Appendix B).
5. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
6. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943); 1960 Wis. L. Rxv. 164.
7. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
8. LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Prac-
tices, 1962 WAsH. U.L.Q. 331, 332.
9. F. INBAU & J. Rzm, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 210 n.157 (3d
ed. 1953); LaFave, supra note 8, at 332-33; 1960 Wis. L. Rxv. 164.
10. Compare People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960), with Peo-
ple v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d 808, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 930 (1962).
11. Missouri has rejected the McNabb-Mallory rule. State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 193
S.W.2d 31 (1946); cf. State v. Lee, 361 Mo. 163, 233 S.W.2d 666 (1950), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Chancy, 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961).
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when juveniles have been detained in violation of statutory requirements.12
While the rationales used to support the two rules may vary, both the
McNabb-MaUory rule and the Arbeiter decision are similar in operation-
both require that a suspect be given consultation with a judicial officer
before interrogation and, in effect, require the exclusion of confessions
obtained in violation of statutes or rules.
It is difficult to compare the Arbeiter decision with decisions from other
jurisdictions involving similar facts, or to estimate the significance of the
Arbeiter decision. The issue presented by Arbeiter is at least initially one
of statutory construction, and statutory language varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Indeed, no jurisdiction has statutory language incorporating
the Missouri mandate that an apprehended juvenile be "immediately and
directly" taken to the juvenile authorities. However, twenty-two juris-
dictions have statutes that are comparable to the Missouri statute.13 Of
the remaining jurisdictions, the majority require notification of a parent,
the juvenile court, or a juvenile officer at some time during the arrest
process.'" Given the difficulty involved in generalizing about this problem,
three statements can be made: (1) some jurisdictions rule inadmissible
any confession obtained in violation of the juvenile code; (2) some jurisdic-
tions require only "substantial compliance" with the juvenile code; and (3)
the District of Columbia excludes from use in later criminal proceedings
any confession or statement given by a juvenile after the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court has attached and prior to his certification to stand trial as
an adult.
The sole case cited by the Missouri court for support of the Arbeiter
rationale was State v. Shaw."5 In Shaw, the Arizona court held inadmissible
the confession of a juvenile because the police failed to comply with the
juvenile code. The Arizona Code provides that upon the arrest of a child
12. Notes 15-21 infra and accompanying text.
13. ALASXA STAT. § 47.10.140 (1962); Aiuz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (1956);
Anx. STAT. ANN. § 45-224 (1964); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-7 (1963); D.C. CoDs
ANN. § 11-912 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.03 (1961); HAWAI REV. LAWS § 333-10
(1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1811 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-815
(1964); LA. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1577 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 119, § 67
(1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-609 (1947); NEB. STAT. § 43-205.02 (Supp.
1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-32 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-43 (Supp. 1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-09 (1960); OHIO Rsv. CODE ANN. § 2151.25 (Page 1954);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1187 (1962); S.D. CODE § 43.0318 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-252 (Supp. 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 610 (Supp. 1965); WASH. REv. CoD
ANN. § 13.04.120 (1962).
14. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2416 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3222 (1956);
MICE. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (518.14) (1962); VA. Cons ANN. § 16.1-197 (1960).
15. 93 Ariz. 40, 378 P.2d 487 (1963).
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under eighteen, the arresting officer "shall forthwith notify the probation
officer.... ."" Shaw was questioned for two and a half to three hours by
the police before he confessed. The probation officer was then notified.
Reversing the conviction, the Arizona court noted that a juvenile is denied
many of the rights essential to due process in criminal proceedings. There-
fore, he is compensated in the juvenile code by procedures not found in
the criminal code; the requirement that the juvenile officer must be notified
is one such compensation. In 1964, the Arizona court in State v. Lopez,"
reaffirmed its holding in Shaw.
A 1964 Louisiana case, In re Garland,"8 held that the conviction of a
juvenile was invalid because the detention and interrogation by the police
for nearly six hours violated the juvenile code. The Garland court did not
hold the confession invalid solely on the basis of the unlawful detention
and interrogation. It also found that the confession was not freely given
and that it was inconsistent with other evidence in the case. Nonetheless,
the case is of considerable interest because the language of the Louisiana
statute which requires any officer detaining a child to "immediately" notify
the court or probation officer is mitigated by the qualifying phrase "and
in any event within twenty-four hours. . ". ."  Apparently, the Louisiana
court concluded that the statutory language required an immediate effort
to notify the proper authorities," a factor notable by its absence in Garland.
Cases from several other jurisdictions, though distinguishable, seem to
adopt the Arbeiter rationale." However, one cannot be certain that these
16. Aluz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (1956).
17. 96 Ariz. 169, 393 P.2d 263 (1964).
18. 160 So. 2d 340, (La. Ct. App. 1964).
19. LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1577 (1951).
20. If the confession had been voluntary, and if the other evidence had been con-
sistent with the confession, the Garland court could have upheld the conviction because
twenty-four hours had not elapsed when the two juveniles were brought to the attention
of the juvenile authorities. However, the court implied that a twenty-four hour delay
required a showing of special circumstances. See In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340 (La.
Ct. App. 1964).
21. Several Florida cases hold that any conviction of an unmarried minor is void
if the parents of the minor were not given notice of his hearing or trial. Collins v. Wain-
wright, 146 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1962); Keene v. Cochran, 146 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1962);
Milligan v. State, 177 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
Hawaii has held that, upon arrest, all juveniles "are to be brought to the attention of
the juvenile court as soon as reasonably practicable." However, the court has not indi-
cated what "reasonably practicable" means and what the effect of a violation of that
requirement would be. In re Castro, 44 Hawaii 455, 355 P.2d 46 (1960).
The Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the conviction of a juvenile when the statu-
tory provisions governing the certification of a juvenile to stand trial as an adult were
not strictly complied with, finding that the language of the code is mandatory. Benge v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss1/10
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jurisdictions, if faced with the facts in Arbeiter, would apply the Arbeiter
rule.
The doctrine of "substantial compliance" with a juvenile code has been
adopted in Massachusetts,2 New Jersey, 3 Ohio,2 and possibly Virginia25
Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1961).
In United States v. Morales, 223 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964), the judge stated:
It is unnecessary to consider whether there was compliance with the Montana
Juvenile Delinquency Act, and particularly with section 10-609, R.C.M. 1947, pro-
viding that "when a delinquent child is taken into custody, 'the officer taking the
child into custody shall immediately report the fact to the court and the case shall
then be proceeded with as provided in this act.'" Id. at 163 n.10.
If one places much weight on the emphasis given "immediately," this case may be read
as supporting Arbeiter. The Federal Juvenile Act was controlling in Morales, making
consideration of the Montana Code unnecessary. The Federal Juvenile Act has an inter-
esting provision on arrest and detention, requiring an arresting officer to "immediately
notify the Attorney General." 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1964). The impracticality of strict
compliance with this provision seems obvious.
22. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 346 Mass. 9, 190 N.E.2d 224 (1963). The Massa-
chusetts court held failure to immediately notify the juvenile court and the parents of a
detained child, as required by statute, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 67 (1965), did not
necessarily render statements of the detained child inadmissible. The court stated: "We
hold only that a violation of the statute in and of itself does not render a statement
inadmissible, if otherwise competent." Id. at 17, 190 N.E.2d at 229. The court ulti-
mately decided that the statement was not "otherwise competent" and held the confes-
sion inadmissible. It had been suggested earlier that § 67 might be "relevant" in "future
litigation." Gordon & Harris, An Investigation and Critique of the Defective Delinquent
Statute in Massachusetts, 30 B.U.L. Rav. 459, 469 (1950).
23. State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 936
(1961). New Jersey was perhaps less candid than the Massachusetts court when it
allowed in evidence confessions obtained from juveniles during nine and a half hours of
questioning at the police station. The court said:
We conclude there were no per se violations of our juvenile rules and practices
in the apprehension without process and their interrogation in police headquarters
before confinement in the detention center. Id. at 535, 161 A.2d at 538.
The New Jersey statute requires "immediate" notification of the juvenile court when a
child is not released to his parents after arrest and detention. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-32
(1952). Apparently, the form that a per se violation might take is left to our imagina-
tion.
24. State v. Stewart, 120 Ohio App. 199, 201 N.E.2d 793 (1963), aff'd, 176 Ohio
St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964). A juvenile murdered a
college girl in Ohio but was not apprehended until one month later in California. An
assistant prosecuting attorney and two policemen were sent to bring the boy back. The
assistant prosecuting attorney acquainted the juvenile with his constitutional rights and
obtained a full confession. Upon his return to Ohio, the juvenile was booked at a police
station and then taken to the juvenile court, rather than first being taken to the juvenile
court as required by OHio REv. Cona ANN. § 2151.25 (Page 1954). Following certifica-
tion for trial as an adult, Stewart was convicted of first degree murder and the death
penalty was imposed. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the confession
was admissible in evidence because the technical violation of the code resulted in no
prejudice to the boy.
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and Arkansas.2" The theory of "substantial compliance" is that a violation
of the juvenile code by the police in arresting and detaining a youth will
not result in the exclusion of a confession, unless the juvenile can show that
the statutory violation, or violations, have been prejudicial-that is, by
proving that the confession was not freely given."
The District of Columbia has devised a different solution to the problem
of using the confession of juveniles. While the McNabb-Mallory rule can-
not apply to juveniles because a juvenile must be taken before the juvenile
court rather than a magistrate, 8 the D.C. court has held that any statement
or confession obtained from a juvenile at any time during his detention
by the juvenile authorities cannot be used in criminal proceedings following
the juvenile's certification to stand trial as an adult.29 Moreover, any con-
A year later, the Stewart case was held controlling in State v. Carder, 3 Ohio App.
2d. 381, 210 N.E.2d 714 (1965). The court conceded that there was, perhaps, a statu-
tory violation of 2151.25, but held that "substantial compliance" with the juvenile code
was sufficient. Id. at 387, 210 N.E.2d at 718.
25. In Durrette v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 735, 113 S.E.2d 842 (1960), a confes-
sion was held admissible though the arrest and detention of the juvenile were not in
"strict conformity" with the Virginia code. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-197 (1960). The
vitality of this case may be questionable because of a recent Virginia case requiring strict
compliance with other sections of the juvenile code. Peyton v. French, 147 S.E.2d 739
(Va. 1966). The Court distinguished Durrette: "That case is readily distinguishable
on the facts and the statutes involved from the present case." Id. at 743. Serious doubts
may be entertained as to how "readily distinguishable" the Durrette case actually is.
26. Monts v. State, 233 Ark. 816, 349 S.W.2d 350 (1961). The confession of a
juvenile was held admissible in a trial resulting in his conviction for bombing a residence.
The confession followed a twenty-four hour interrogation. The difficulty with the case is
that the juvenile was not represented by counsel on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme
Court and no challenge to the conviction based on § 45-224 of the juvenile code, requir-
ing an arresting officer "to take said child directly before the juvenile court," was made.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-224 (1947).
27. State v. Stewart, 120 Ohio App. 199, 201 N.E.2d 793 (1963), aff'd, 176 Ohio St.
156, 198 N.E.2d 439, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
28. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
29. Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Edwards v. United
States, 330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C.
Cir. 1961); Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The court refuses to
allow statements made in the informal atmosphere of juvenile proceedings to be used as
evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings. STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 13 (6th
ed. 1959). Statutes prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in juvenile cases in sub-
sequent civil or criminal actions are common. F. SUSSMAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
32-33 (1950).
The states, unlike the District of Columbia, have refused to apply their statutory
provisions strictly against the subsequent use of a juvenile's testimony. See Paulsen,
Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957). For an interesting
example of this problem see Dearing v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983
(1947). In addition, most states hold that a state constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy is not applicable to juvenile proceedings. People v. Silverstein, 121
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss1/10
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fession or other evidence presented at the certification hearing cannot be
used in a subsequent criminal proceeding." This solution was suggested
in the Arbeiter case31 but was rejected by the Missouri court. 2 The court
held that section 211.271(3), which prevents evidence used in "cases"
before the juvenile courts from being used in subsequent proceedings,
refers only to delinquency adjudications as distinguished from police interro-
gations and certification hearings.3 "
As observed above, the Arbeiter decision comes at a time when the
juvenile court system is under serious criticism for its failure to afford
juveniles some or all of the constitutional safeguards applicable in adult
criminal proceedings.3 ' Arbeiter seems to provide the juvenile system a
means of demonstrating that a juvenile need not be afforded the usual con-
stitutional safeguards in order to assure that his rights are protected at the
interrogation stage of the proceedings." The decision makes clear that in
cases in which a juvenile may be certified to stand trial as an adult, he
must be taken to the juvenile court before interrogation. The juvenile
officer is thus vested with wide discretion to regulate interrogation so that
the juvenile receives "fair treatment." 6
There can be no doubt that the Arbeiter requirements apply to cases in
which the juvenile is ultimately certified to stand trial as an adult.3 How-
ever, because the decision to certify a juvenile is a matter of discretion
with the juvenile court judge in most jurisdictions," (though in some,
Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914
(1958); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); In re Smith, 114
N.Y.S.2d 673 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952); State v. Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270
(1946); Antieau, supra note 3; Sheridan, Double Jeopardy and Waiver in juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings, 23 FED. PRoB. 43 (Dec. 1959).
30. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But see United
States v. Stevenson, 170 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1959).
31. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-6, State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
32. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Mo. 1966).
33. id.
34. Notes 3-4 sup ra.
35. See State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
36. Mr. Justice Fortas, in the Kent case, reluctantly held that a juvenile is not en-
titled to the full range of criminal safeguards essential in criminal proceedings, but rather
to "fair treatment." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-556 (1966). As the term
is used in this paper it does not necessarily carry with it the constitutional connotation
Justice Fortas may have had in mind.
37. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
38. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961); Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 211.071 (1959); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-15 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-27 (Supp. 1965); OHio Rv.
CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1953). Of course, all jurisdictions have some certifica-
tion procedure. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2410 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3214
(Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 54 (1957).
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certification is mandatory if the offense is serious) " the arresting officer
cannot be certain whether a juvenile will ultimately be certified. Therefore,
at the minimum, the Arbeiter requirements should be followed in any
offense serious enough that certification is possible, despite the fact that
certification rarely occurs."'
Whatever merit there may be in the District of Columbia approach to
the problem of police detention and interrogation of juveniles, it has not
been adopted elsewhere, and it seems unlikely that it will be so adopted.4"
Thus, one is left with a choice between the Arbeiter rule and the doctrine
of "substantial compliance." While the "substantial compliance" doctrine
has the advantage of allowing the use of unquestionably truthful confessions
-though obtained through police practices that are violative of statutory
requirements-this advantage is more than offset by the disadvantages
inherent in the doctrine. Unless a confession obtained in "substantial com-
pliance" with the juvenile code is held inadmissible, neither the juvenile
nor society has any assurance that the requirements of the juvenile code
will in fact be complied with. The theory of the juvenile system, that
juvenile offenders must be treated differently than adults, is given little
chance to operate if a juvenile is brought before the juvenile court only
after detention and interrogation resulting in a confession.
The unresolved question is whether the Arbeiter requirements are applic-
able in non-certification cases. For a number of reasons, it is suggested
that they should be. First, the Missouri statute applies to the arrest of any
child for "an offense." 2 Second, nothing in Arbeiter indicates any intent
to limit its application to certification cases. Finally, the Arbeiter decision
can be a means of providing adequate protection of juveniles' rights without
applying the usual constitutional safeguards to juvenile proceedings. If this
is a relevant factor, and apparently it is, 3 the Arbeiter requirements should
be applicable in non-certification cases.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1159 (1953) (capital felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.02 (1961) (capital offense or life imprisonment); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570
(1951) (capital offense or attempt to commit a capital offense); TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-265 (Supp. 1966) (rape, armed robbery or murder).
40. Note, Informal Disposition of Delinquency Cases: Survey and Comparison of
Court Delegation of Decision-Making, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 258.
41. See Paulsen, supra note 29. The Missouri court rejected the District of Columbia
solution in Arbeiter. Note 31 supra.
42. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 211.061 (1959).
43. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Altman, The Effect of the
Miranda Case on Confessions in the Juvenile Court, 5 Am. Cmu. L.Q. 79 (1967);
Antieau, supra note 3; Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law, 11
WAYNE L. Rrv. 597 (1965); Comment, 7 SANTA CLARA LAw. 114 (1966). See also
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss1/10
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The Arbeiter decision affects directly only the detention and interrogation
of a juvenile. It would be a mistake to overestimate the effect the decision
may have on the entire field of juvenile jurisdiction."' However, while
these limitations on the impact of the decision must be recognized, the
Arbeiter approach, by insisting that the juvenile courts have wide discretion
in controlling the questioning of juveniles, is a proper response to the prob-
lem of detention and interrogation of juveniles.
Ketcham, supra note 3; Knowles, Crime Investigation in the School: Its Constitutional
Dimensions, J. FAMILy L. 151 (1964); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 74-75 (1966); U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING
wrrn CHILDREN 38-39 (1954).
44. That the adoption of an Arbeiter type rule does not resolve all the problems facing
the juvenile court system is graphically demonstrated by a recent Arizona case. Applica-
tion of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), prob. juris. noted, 384 U.S. 997
(1966). Arizona has a rule similar to the Arbeiter rule, State v. Shaw, 93 Ariz. 40, 378
P.2d 487 (1963), and Gault was taken immediately to the juvenile court. However,
the Arizona court held that there is no right of appeal from a juvenile court order;
that the right to counsel before a juvenile court is discretionary with the juvenile judge;
that the juvenile judge need not advise a juvenile of his right against self-incrimination,
though a juvenile aware of this right may exercise it; and that hearsay evidence that
"reasonable men" would rely upon "in serious affairs" is admissible in juvenile delin-
quency hearings. The case is now before the Supreme Court. Application of Gault,
99 Ariz. 181, 407 P. 2d 760 (1965), prob. juris, noted, 384 U.S. 997 (1966).
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